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NOTES AND COMMENT
EQUITY AND THE DISPARAGEMENT OF BUSINESS
Generally the intangible that will ultimately determine whether a
business will prosper or fail is "good will". To destroy the good wili
is to destroy the business. Recognizing this, merchants faced with a
libelous attack upon one of the components of "good will" have in-
variably sought to enlist the aid of equity. To them, the only effective
relief is an injunction. But the courts of equity, as a general rule,
have turned a deaf ear to these pleas and have indicated that the
remedy in such cases is to be found in a court of law. Is such a dis-
position of these cases sound in principle or logic?
In the early New York case of Brandreth v. Lance,' involving a
personal libel, the court refused an injunction on the grounds that it
could not assume jurisdiction of the case ". . . without infringing
upon the liberty of the press, and attempting to exercise a power of
preventative justice which, as the legislature has decided, cannot
safely be entrusted to any tribunal consistently with the principles
of free government." 2 This refusal to place previous restraints
upon publications is a consequence of the theory advanced by Black-
stone that freedom of speech and liberty of the press necessarily re-
quire that publications be not restrained in advance.3 The theory
was an outgrowth of the collapse of censorship in England which
followed the invention of printing and continued until near the end
of the seventeenth century.4 Fear of censorship pervades the
theory. American courts have been so influenced by the doctrine that
the general rule in this country is to the effect that equity will not
restrain a mere libel or slander regardless of the fact that the false
statement may injure the plaintiff in his business, profession, trade,
credit standing or property.5 The question remains whether this fear
of censorship, which controls the minds of many jurists and causes
them to be opposed to equitable intervention in cases of the disparage-
ment of business, is well founded.
Dean Pound revealed a fundamental weakness in Blackstone's
theory when he said, "But this view is open to obvious criticism.
For if liability for any sort of publication which the legislature
chooses to penalize may be imposed upon the publisher after the act,
the result may easily be to effectually prevent indirectly and so estab-
18 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839).2 Id. at 26.
3 CHAse's BLAcicsTON- 917, 918 (2d ed. 1884).4 WALSH, HISTORY Op ENGLISH AND AMERIcAN LAW 399-401 (1926).
5 Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F. 2d
963 (7th Cir. 1927); Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery
Light & Water Power Co., 171 Fed. 553 (N. D. Ala. 1909); Kidd v. Horry,
28 Fed. 773 (E. D. Pa. 1886); Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114
Mass. 69 (1873); Singer v. Rommerick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5
N. Y. S. 2d 607 (2d Dep't 1938); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y.
384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902) ; Mauger v. Dick, 55 How. Pr. 132 (N. Y. 1878).
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lish a censorship . *.".." 6 Thus it is seen that the legislature, by
enacting severe statutes in regard to slander or libel might easily
establish, in effect, a censorship, and yet that fact has not caused
consternation in legal circles or elsewhere. Apart from this weak-
ness in the theory, it is to be observed that a previous restraint upon
a non-libelous publication is as effective as is a previous restraint
upon a libelous publication in establishing a censorship and destroying
freedom of speech and of the press and yet the courts have enjoined
non-libelous publications.7 In the case of Near v. Minnesota 8
the court laid down the rule that the chief purpose of the constitu-
tional protection of liberty of press is the prevention of previous re-
straints upon publication. That case involved a statute, which the
State of Minnesota had enacted providing for the abatement, as a
public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers,
magazines or other periodicals. The attorney for the county wherein
such a periodical was published was authorized to maintain an action
for injunction in the name of the state. The court held that the
statute violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and liberty of the press. However, in its discussion of "previous
restraints", the court declared, "The objection has been made that
the principle as to immunity from previous restraint is stated too
broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. That is
undoubtedly true; the protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited . . . These limitations are not applicable here.
Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the extent of authority
to prevent publications in order to protect private rights according to
the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of
equity." o Thus the court did not lay down as a universal rule that
it was unconstitutional to place a previous restraint upon a publica-
tion; on the contrary, it expressly declared that there are exceptions
and indicated that where private rights are concerned equity might
possess some power to place a previous restraint upon a publication.
In addition to refusing to enjoin in the fear that a censorship
might be established thereby, the courts have advanced the following
arguments as the basis for withholding equitable relief:
(1) That the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law in the
form of damages, and as a consequence thereof, the defendant does
not require the extraordinary relief rendered in equity.' 0
6 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Person-
alities, 29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 651 (1916).
7 Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (Ch. 1847); Gee v.
Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818); Grigsby v. Breckin-
ridge, 2 Bush 480 (Ky. 1867); King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730
(1917).
s 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
9Id. at 715, 716. (Italics ours.)
10 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga. 69 (1873);
Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. 386, 51 Atl. 1024 (1902).
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It has been held in one case that the fact that the plaintiff has
no adequate remedy at law because of inability to prove special dam-
ages is immaterial.'1
(2) That libel actions involve the question of the truth or falsity
of statements made by the defendant, and on such an issue of fact
the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.12
(3) That libel is a crime and equity lacks the power to prevent
crime.'3
A careful consideration of these propositions indicates that each
of them possesses an inherent weakness:
(1) A plaintiff whose business has been attacked by libelous
statements has, at most, an inadequate remedy at law. This is so
because such a plaintiff must allege and prove special damages.' 4
Proof of such damages is a practical impossibility.
(2) When an action is properly one for equitable intervention,
a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial, and accordingly he is not
deprived of any constitutional right.
(3) Although libel is a crime and equity lacks the power to
prevent crime the chancery is not precluded from acting to prevent
injury through a civil wrong merely because the act in another aspect
may be the subject of a criminal prosecution. 15
It is deemed advisable at this point to call attention to the dis-
tinction between attacks on a person's business reputation or pro-
fessional reputation which result in the most direct way in injuries
to the right to carry on a business and attacks which are directed
"I Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
12 Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Co., 171 Fed. 553 (N. D. Ala. 1909). The plaintiff, a public utility company,
sought to restrain a competing company from circulating, among the customers
of the plaintiff, false and malicious statements to the effect that the plaintiff
was insolvent and that there were dissensions in its management and that it
would shortly go into the hands of a receiver. The court refused an injunc-
tion declaring that the defendant had the right to a jury trial on the issue of
the truth of the statements and that the court could place no previous restraint
on the defendant's right of publication. In Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (E. D.
Pa. 1886), the court refused to grant an injunction to restrain a defendant from
publishing certain circular letters which were alleged to be libelous and in-
jurious to the patent rights and business of the plaintiff. The court stated that
the law was well established that equity will not grant injunctive relief to pre-
vent the publication of a libel even though the libel was calculated to injure
property.
23 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818) (dictum).
24 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902) ;
Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N. Y. 1830); Le Massena v. Storm, 62
App. Div. 150, 70 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't 1901).51in re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
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against the business itself. Defamation of business may consist either
of words disparaging the quality of the plaintiff's property or of words
which attack the plaintiff's title to property. Defamation of a plain-
tiff's reputation consists of words imputing incompetency, corruption,
or dishonesty to the plaintiff with reference to the business, trade or
profession in which he is engaged. Concerning the latter, Professor
Walsh has this to say, ". . . injury to business arising from personal
injury to reputation will not be restrained in equity for much the
same reason that a threatened physical injury to a man will not be
restrained as an injury to property, although it will incapacitate him
from engaging in his trade, profession or business." 16
It is to be noted that attacks directed against a person's business
reputation are slanderous per se.17 This simply means that damage
is inferred and need not be proved.' 8 It also means that such a plain-
tiff has an adequate remedy at law and is not required to appeal to
equity for aid. The fact remains, however, that the merchant whose
business, as distinguished from reputation, has been libelled has no
adequate remedy at law and must appeal to equity. That the courts
are dissatisfied with the rule declaring that equity may not enjoin
the disparagement of a business is evident, for when a court has been
moved by the prayer of the plaintiff relief has been granted on the
ground that equity can restrain a libel if it is incidental to another
wrong over which the chancery has jurisdiction,'9 and there is a trend
toward recognition of defamation and disparagement of a competitor's
goods as unfair competition in and of itself for which the only effec-
tive relief is injunction. Thus in Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith 20 the de-
fendant had instructed his salesmen to make false statements as to
the efficacy of the plaintiff's product, to tell prospective purchasers
that they could be fined for selling the product, and that United States
Government inspectors had the right to seize such goods. Spurious
documents were published by the defendant which purported to be
official documents of the United States Department of Agriculture
dealing with the plaintiff's product. These documents were given to
the defendant's salesmen to be shown to prospective purchasers in
order to destroy the plaintiff's business. The Appellate Division said,
"The judgment which is here under review restrains the continuance
both of the practice of false and fraudulent disparagement and of the
16WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 262 (1930).
17 Nunan v. Bullman, 256 App. Div. 741, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (3d Dep't
1939).
Is Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425 (N. Y. 1854).
19 Bourjois v. Park Drug Co., 82 F. 2d 468 (1936) (unfair competition);
American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (2d Cir. 1913) (inducing
breach of contract); Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888)(illegal boycott); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931)
(illegal conspiracy) ; Shevers Ice Cream Co. v. Polar Products Co., 194 N. Y.
Supp. 44 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (unfair competition).20 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dep't 1928).
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practice of the dishonest business methods. The jurisdiction of the
courts to restrain libels has been vigorously denied and asserted. In
England the equity courts formerly refused such jurisdiction ...
Now, however, the jurisdiction is fully recognized. . . . Conflict of
view exists in the federal courts. . . In our own state the general
tendency has been against such jurisdiction. . . .Actions for unfair
competition are not now confined to 'passing off' cases. . . . The
courts have been increasingly inclined to protect business interests
even when such interests do not come within strict definitions of
property. The judgment here in enjoining false and fraudulent dis-
paragement,-protects the intangible, but real relationship existing be-
tween a merchant and his usual customers-his 'good will.' . . . We,
therefore, do not hold that the judgment was erroneous in enjoining
the practice of false disparagement of plaintiff's product." 21 In Old
Investors and Traders Corporation v. Jenkins 22 the New York
Appellate Division upheld the lower court in its refusal to dismiss
a complaint which charged the defendants with having published cir-
culars containing false statements intended to injure the plaintiff and
its business and which prayed for an injunction to enjoin the publica-
tion of another such circular. The defendants, one the publisher and
the other the distributor of the circular, were both enjoined on the
theory that much more was involved than the publication of a
libel. The conduct of the defendants was characterized as unfair
competition.
These cases indicate that the New York courts are becoming
more appreciative of the need for injunctive relief in cases of trade
libel and are moving away from the doctrine which demands that they
find an underlying tort in order to grant relief when a business is
being libelled. The barrier, in New York, which stands in the way
of the courts and requires them to adhere to this doctrine or to seek
for minute distinctions, is the case of Marlin Fire Arms Co. v.
Shields,23 which held that equity would not enjoin a libel. The
21 Id. at 191, 192, 229 N. Y. Supp. at 697, 698.
22 225 App. Div. 860, 233 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dep't 1929).
23 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902). Here the plaintiff, a manufac-
turer of firearms, had been advertising with the defendant, the publisher of a
well-known and widely bought magazine for sportsmen, but had terminated his
contract of advertising with the defendant. In order to coerce the plaintiff
into renewing the contract of advertising, the defendant wrote sham letters
purporting to be written by correspondents and published as coming from cor-
respondents, in which the pretended correspondents criticized the plaintiff's
rifles alleging that they were defective. A demurrer was sustained. The court
stated that the words would not be actionable at law unless special damages
were proved and that the complaint negatived such claim. Thus the court
admitted that no action at law was available to the plaintiff. The court then
considered the question, whether the malicious defamation of a manufactured
article for which the manufacturer has no adequate remedy at law because of
his inability to prove special damages, is the subject of equitable cognizance
and concluded that it NA-as not.
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Marlin case, it will be observed, is distinguishable on the facts from
the Allen case and the Old Investors case. The acts of libel in the
latter cases had also satisfied the requirements of the tort of unfair
competition whereas in the Marlin case they did not. That the Marlin
case is now a weak barrier is evidenced not only by the fact that the
courts have tended to confine it to its own facts but by the granting
of an injunction by a lower court on a set of facts not unlike those
in the Marlin case.2 4  In 1946 the New York Court of Appeals de-
cided Advance Music Corporation v. American Tobacco Co.25 which
indicates a possible future repudiation of the rule in the Marlin case.
The plaintiff in that case was a music publisher and the defendant a
sponsor of a radio program. The defendant's program advertised
that the nine or ten songs performed on their weekly program con-
stituted the nine or ten most popular songs of the week and that the
selection was the result of an extensive and accurate survey. The
complaint alleged that the program rating was not the result of an
accurate survey and that by omitting the plaintiff's songs, the defen-
dant had injured plaintiff's business. Injunctive relief was sought
and the Appellate Division, on motion, dismissed the complaint, stat-
ing that ". . . the law is well settled in this state that equity will
not intervene to enjoin the disparagement of property." 26 The Court
of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Appellate Division declaring
that a complaint which alleges an intentional infliction of temporal
damages for which there is no legal justification, and asks for an
injunction against publication, is sufficient against a motion to dis-
miss. The court expressly declared that it was not determining the
nature of the relief to which the plaintiff was entitled, but that the
complaint stated a cause of action in law or equity. In view of the
fact that the court could not fail to realize that the plaintiff would
be unable to prove special damages and consequently would have no
remedy at law, the court's declaration is significant.
The federal courts also appear to be moving away from the rule
that equity will not enjoin a trade libel. In Black Yates, Inc. v.
Mahogany Ass'nY the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
publishing disparaging statements to the effect that lumber sold by
the plaintiff under the name "Philippine Mahogany" was not ma-
24 Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 885
(Sup. Ct. 1938). Here the defendants put an automobile, which they had
bought from the plaintiff, in front of his store decorating the car with signs
deriding its qualities. The court granted a temporary injunction. Realizing
that the case of Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields was an obstacle, the court
attempted to distinguish it from the case at bar by saying that the acts herein
complained of were more serious and were different in character from those
in the Marlin case.
25296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. 2d 401 (1946), reversing 268 App. Div. 707, 53
N. Y. S. 2d 337 (1st Dep't 1945).
26268 App. Div. 707, 711, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 337, 341 (Ist Dep't 1945).
27 129 F. 2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942).
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hogany but an inferior wood, a substitute. In writing the opinion,
Circuit Judge Clark laid much stress upon Dean Pound's often quoted,
"Most of the cases that grant relief speak strongly of the injustice
that must result from denial of jurisdiction in these cases. In sub-
stance the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business at the mercy
of any insolvent malicious defamer who has sufficient imagination to
lay out a skillful campaign of extortion. So long as denial of relief
rests on no stronger basis than authority our courts are sure to find
a way out." 28 Clark then stated, "We are quite willing to repudiate
the 'waning doctrine that equity will not restrain the trade libel.'
We are further willing to do so directly and without hiding behind
the other equitable principles put forward in some of the cases." 29
The court had some doubt as to the correctness of its decision on
this point, consequently a rehearing was ordered. On rehearing the
court stated as a final conclusion that it was not required to depart
from precedent since the allegations of the complaint were sufficient
to support a charge of unfair competition which afforded a basis for
the granting of an injunction. Nevertheless, the fact that the court
stated that there was an urgent need for equitable relief in cases like
the instant one where genuine proprietary interests of great social
and commercial significance to the parties are affected, would indi-
cate that the court would have adhered to its original conclusion
even if it had been unable to find these additional grounds for relief.
It is submitted that the present disposition by equity of cases
involving the disparagement of business is inadequate. It is to be
hoped that the courts will recognize that by refusing injunctive relief
in the class of cases under discussion, they are merely swelling the
ranks of those cases designated damnum absque injuria; and that
they will discard the rule which requires them to find some under-
lying tort in order to issue an injunction against the publication in-
asmuch as such a disposition of these cases falls short of accomplishing
practical justice, which is the ultimate goal of our judicial system.
JAMEs F. NIEHOFF.
2 8 Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personalities, 29
HARV. L. REv. 651 (1916).
29 129 F. 2d 227 (3d Cir. 1942).
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